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 Much attention has been focused on the decline of traditional employment structures in 
the advanced industrial countries. Lesser attention has focused on this issue in Asia. In this 
comparative essay, we examine the changes in employment security in China, India, Japan, and 
South Korea.  We focus on the historical development of the employment security social contract  
in these countries, noting the institutional features that gave rise to it in each country. We then 
examine the resilience of employment security norms under recent economic pressures. We find 
there has been substantial erosion in employment security during the 1990s in all four countries 
due to both increased competition and economic liberalization, although there is some variation 
in both the rate of erosion as well as the prospects for revival of the social contract. We assess 
the possibilities of a revival in this particular social contract, and the impact of the erosion on 




Dramatic  changes in employment relations systems have taken place in the 1990s in 
most countries (Katz, 1993, Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000). Of  the many changes in employment 
relations systems (e.g., bargaining structures, union declines, externalization of production), one 
development that has attracted a large amount of popular attention is the change in the structure 
of employment.  In almost every nation, the proportion of people who have full-time permanent 
employment has been decreasing , while part-time, temporary and contingent employment has 
been on the increase. This decline in "secure" employment is a viewed by social critics and 
particularly critics of globalization (seen by them as a driving force in these changes)  as a 
breakdown in the "social contract"  and there have been  numerous calls for both legislative and 
institutional intervention  (particularly from labor unions, but also other groups in civil society) 
to prevent further erosion  in employment security.     
In this article, we focus on the decline of secure employment in Asia. We focus 
particularly on Japan and Korea (Asia's industrial leaders), and China and India (the two largest 
nations who have only recently liberalized their economies).  All of these nations have also 
experienced considerable declines in employment security.  For instance, whereas the Chinese 
Communist Party spoke frequently about workers all “eating out of one big pot”, Chinese State 
Owned Enterprises have retrenched 20 million workers over the last two years (O'Leary, 1998).  
Despite Indian constitutional provisions that the state “shall endeavour to secure” work for all 
workers, the Indian government is now exerting considerable pressure on public sector 
employees to retire “voluntarily”(Markandan, 1996).  Unlike in China and India, in Japan it is 
private sector workers whose employment security is under threat.  Even large Japanese 
corporations, famous world-wide for their life-time employment practices, seem to now be 
moving toward less secure employment relationships, a direction that is true as well of large 
Korean conglomerates (Chaebol) as well (Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000).  
The departure from a high degree of employment security has been met with varied 
responses. In India, for example, very few public sector employees have volunteered to retire. 
And Korean workers, long known for their militance in the face of authoritarianism, now strike 
in response to employers plans to retrench. In Japan also there is public concern regarding the 
scale of layoffs  (particularly white collar layoffs) , while there is considerable public unease 
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about the growing inequalities in China.  These reactions are similar to those found in the 
advanced industrial countries, especially those with strong trade union movements who are 
exerting considerable efforts to preserve this "social contract". There is considerable public 
support for the efforts of the trade unions, particularly in Western Europe and Scandinavia, 
where the norm of all citizens having a secure job was fairly well developed after the  Second 
World War.     
The focus of this comparative essay is to  examine the historical development of the norm 
of employment security (specifically to understand the conditions that gave rise to it). We 
examine the scope of this norm, and how that scope has changed in recent years due to economic 
and other pressures. We also examine how resilient this norm is, and the national and workplace 
institutions that contribute to resilience in each of the four nations. We conclude with our 
provisional assessment of the future prospects regarding employment security, and the 
significance of this norm for  unorganized workers (a much larger proportion of the population)  
in each country.  
 
Social Contract and Employment Security 
Social Contract is a concept from political philosophy that dates back to Plato, (Lacey, 
1996).  Social contracts help to legitimate power relations.(Blackburn, 1994), and generally 
focus on the relationship between individuals and other individuals in states. In the sphere of 
political science they are often seen as agreements among individuals so that the terms of social 
contracts must be terms that every individual can accept.(Gaus, 1999)  Rawls claims that social 
contracts are predicated on the notion of “justice as fairness” (Gaus, 1999)  However, Sened 
argues that social contracts are not based on principles of justice but are rather “institutional 
remedies to social dilemmas.”(Sened, 1997: 12)  Sened claims that social contracts “evolve” in 
response to changes in the dilemmas that social actors face.(Sened, 1997: 12)  In other words, 
governments and other powerful actors in society attempt to resolve these dilemmas as well as 
alter social contracts in order to advance their own interests(Sened, 1997).  
In the industrial relations literature, social contracts have been used to describe a large 
number of  employment relations interactions. The term has been used, for instance to describe 
highly centralized bargaining systems in heavily unionized Scandinavian countries, to describe 
tripartite arrangements in several other countries (e.g., Singapore), as well as to describe 
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workplace and firm level practices common to all workplaces. As such, employer paid benefits 
are seen as part of the social contract of employment, and more recently, employment security 
has been viewed as a social contract. We understand employment-security norms in China, India, 
Japan, and Korea as the subject of a social contract that provides some legitimacy to employment 
relationships.  Although in some cases these norms have been codified into law or collective 
bargaining agreements, in others they have been more implicit but nonetheless powerful.  
Sened’s characterization of social contracts meshes fairly well with our cases.  Consistent with 
Sened, we discuss how employment security norms were shaped by complex interactions among 
employers, employees, and governments in response to social dilemmas.  We also underscore 
how these norms have evolved and been “rewritten” by powerful social actors over time. 
 In the cases we examine (and in most countries), only certain employers (large private 
firms or government enterprises) and only certain employees (the core, unionized labor force of 
large private firms or government enterprises) have been in an employment relationship where 
there is clearly a norm of employment security.  However, this norm has had ramifications that 
extend throughout the society and economy and thus affect even citizens who have not been 
directly protected by employment security norms. For example, the lifetime employment system 
in Japan has been associated with a substantial labor market segmentation and a lack of  job 
mobility. Because these lifetime jobs  in big corporations are so prized (only 30% of Japanese 
workers get these jobs), most families aspire to these jobs for their children. This, in turn, puts 
considerable  pressure on the children to do well at school, and thus, on schools to ensure that 
children are well educated. This translates into much higher school workloads for children at a 
very young age. This affects the employment pattern of women…..they prefer part time 
employment so that they can supervise their children's education, including after school tuition. 
One consequence is that women almost never break through the corporate "glass ceiling".1. 
Further, the lifetime employment for the core unionized workers is sustained to some degree by 
the prevalence of subcontracting practices where workers in the lower subcontracting tiers work 
in less than ideal conditions and without labor union protection.   Similar pressures are apparent 
in Korea (where jobs with the big corporations, the chaebol, are equally prized). In China, where 
the state owned companies have until recently guaranteed through the "iron rice bowl" system, 
                                                          
1  This is just one example of how employment security norms can have elaborate social effects that extend beyond 
the firm and are not simply economic.   
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employment security as well as employment for one's children,  the implicit social contract 
affects the education behaviors of an entire generation. The scarce job opportunities in India, 
coupled with its large population and the social contract of employment security in both 
government and in the private sector (backed by legislation), also puts considerable pressure on 
children at a young age to obtain these coveted jobs, with similar social effects. Thus when this 
apparently stable system changes, its ripple effects are likely to be widespread. 
 Apart from society, secure employment also has important ramifications for employment 
relations and productivity at the level of the firm. On the one hand, neo-classical economists 
argue that employment security norms constitute some degree of labor market inflexibility that 
reduces productivity and growth. On the other hand, the Japanese employment relations system, 
with job security as a central element in the matrix of organizational norms (Marsh 1992 and 
Ouchi, 1981), has been suggested as being one of the most flexible ER systems in the world. 
Employment security has been associated with high productivity in a large number of studies 
(Kochan, Katz, McKersie, 1986), and appears to be a central ingredient in getting higher skilled 
employees to invest in participation in decisionmaking required of high skill production systems. 
Thus, when this central norm changes, it is important to understand the reasons for this change  
 Since employment security norms have affected even citizens who have not been directly 
protected by them, such citizens can be seen as indirect parties to the social contract.  If they are, 
it is not clear whether or not the terms of any social contract we examine have ever been terms 
that all parties to the social contract would accept.  The extensive yet sometimes uncertain effects 
of the employment-security social contract on society and the economy make this difficult to 
determine.  This is especially important since, in the instances we examine, only a minority of all 
workers were ever direct parties to the contract. 
The social contracts we examine are all rooted roughly in the mid-20th century.  Their 
origin is concomitant with the industrialization of these late industrializers and their existence is 
predicated upon specific industrialization strategies and systems of industrial organization that 
are time-bound.  Furthermore, in some cases undermining of the employment security norm 
began numerous years ago.  Thus, the duration of the employment security norms we examine is 
not great.  The bounds of the employment-security norms we examine are often not clear. 
Regardless of whether such norms were transmitted to unorganized workers,  it is clear for the 
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cases we examine that employment security norms have had a large influence on at least a small 
fraction of employment relationships in the post-WWII era. 
 
 
II. The Development of Employment Security in China, India, Japan, and 
Korea 
 
 The two subsections of this section deal separately with each of the four countries.  The 
first subsection covers the development of the social contract concerning employment security 
up until the beginning of the 1990s.  The second one picks up where the first one leaves off and 
continues to the present.  In each of the subsections we examine both how pressures have 
threatened to undermine the social contract and how the social contract has held up under these 
pressures.  The division between subsections at the beginning of the 1990s is somewhat arbitrary.  
Threats to the social contract in these countries did not suddenly emerge at the beginning of the 
1990s, nor did they emerge in all four countries at the same time.  However, these pressures did 
seem to intensify at some point in the 1990s in all four countries.2
 
Historical Development of Social Contracts Until the Beginning of the 1990s 
 
The case of Japan to the early 1990s 
 In Japan, employment security is known as life-time employment (LTE).  Although LTE 
is one of the “three pillars” of the Japanese system of industrial relations (LTE, seniority-based 
wages, enterprise unionism), like the other pillars it has never covered more than 20-30% of the 
non-agricultural workforce.(Takahashi, 1997; Rengo, 1998; Gordon, 1998)  LTE originated in 
Japanese industry shortly before WWII but did not become widespread and established as a norm 
until at least the 1950s.(Gordon, 1985; Takahashi, 1997; Nakamura, 1993)  Explanations for why 
the norm originated vary from the need to train and retain skilled employees (Takahashi, 1997)3  
to government regulation aimed at decreasing turnover among industrial labor.(Gordon, 1985) 
                                                          
2 This accords well with recent arguments that the late 1980s and early 1990s have been a significant period of 
change in Asian industrial relations systems, and the intensification of globalization.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000) 
3 This author claims that LTE spread to blue-collar and clerical workers only after the war. 
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After WWII, confederations of communist and left-wing social-democrat enterprise 
unions dominated Japan’s trade union scene.(Nakamura, 1993)  These unions were militant and 
strongly resisted mass lay-offs.(Price 1996)  The unions were very prevalent in very large 
businesses but very infrequent in small ones, categories Japanese industry was divided into prior 
to and after the war.(Smitka, 1991)  Until 1950, the large-business component of Japanese 
industry was dominated by interlocking conglomerates known as zaibatsu.  Even after these were 
formally dissolved in 1950, the economy remained divided between very large firms and 
relatively small ones.(Smitka, 1991) 
 As output expanded rapidly during the 1950s, Japanese large firms developed a 
mechanism that enabled them to respond to rapid fluctuations in demand, circumvent their highly 
unionized, highly militant employees, and limit the expansion in the numbers of these 
employees.  They began subcontracting en masse to smaller firms.(Nishiguchi, 1994)  This 
practice resulted in a new kind of industrial organization in which firms divided by size were 
united through dense networks of subcontracting relationships.(Smitka, 1991)  Also during the 
1950s, the three pillars of Japanese industrial relations began to proliferate and become 
institutionalized in large Japanese firms.(Price, 1996)  At least one of these pillars, LTE, has not 
protected employees in small Japanese firms.(Takahash, 1997; Gordon, 1998)  Thus in the 1950s 
a clear distinction in employment practices between those in the large sector and those in the 
small sector emerged, employees in the former (internal labor markets) protected by LTE and 
employees in the latter (external labor markets) not protected by LTE.  During this decade there 
was also a move away from militant to cooperative industrial relations among unionized workers 
in large Japanese firms, with cooperative industrial relations becoming predominant in the 
1960s.(Gordon, 1998)   By connecting these various developments, we see that the spread of the 
three pillars, including LTE, throughout Japanese large businesses is concomitant with both the 
moderation of unions in these large businesses as well as with the emergence of a system of 
industrial organization in which these larger businesses were linked through subcontracting with 
smaller businesses whose employees were generally not unionized and not protected by LTE. 
 By the latter 1960s what is known as the postwar consensus, or the triumph of 
cooperative industrial relations, had emerged.(Kume, 1998)  This consensus was forged between 
moderates in both labor and business, and it took the form of a tradeoff; employees of large firms 
would shun work-stoppages while large firms would provide LTE and allow for wage gains to 
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match productivity gains.(Gordon, 1998)  Given the continuing 10% annual rates of growth and 
rapid increases in productivity through the 1960s, both sides had economic incentive to forge this 
sort of consensus.  The postwar consensus in Japan, including that component of it concerning 
employment security that we refer to as a social contract, was neither codified into law nor 
generally written into agreements between employees and firms.  Instead, it was an informal 
norm shared by both workers and managers.(Nakamura, 1993)  Conformance with this norm 
during the 1960s may not have been possible without the rapid growth of the 1960s.(Nakamura, 
1993)  The slowing of growth in latter decades tested the durability of this norm. 
 The Japanese economy slowed from an annual growth rate of 10% during the 1960s to a 
rate of 4.5% during the 1970s.(Sako, 1997)  This slowing and the unstable economic 
environment, resulting largely from the two oil crises, together put pressure on LTE .  The 1973 
oil crisis was followed by mass dismissals of Japanese workers in both internal and external 
labor markets.  These dismissals were associated with the need to be more competitive in export 
markets and a widespread rationalisation of the shop-floor culminating in lean production.(Sako, 
1997)  Small firms resorted to outright discharge about 1/3 of the time while large firms 
practiced voluntary severance almost exclusively (Nakamura, 1993), indicating the norm of LTE 
did not permeate all of society or all workplaces equally.4  While the use of voluntary severances 
rather than outright discharges by large firms indicates resiliency through flexibility of LTE, it 
also is a dilution of LTE.  Although employees were compensated, voluntary severance is a 
means of preventing employees from working as long as they had intended to.  Furthermore, 
some employees in large Japanese firms agreed to take a voluntary severance only after being 
subjected to “patting on the shoulder” and “subtle psychological pressure from 
colleagues”.(Nakamura, 1993, p.13)  Still, voluntary severance is not the same as outright 
discharge.  We refer to voluntary severance and other mechanisms by which employers adjust 
employment levels downward without resorting to outright discharge of workers protected by 
employment security as employment security adjustment mechanisms (ESAMs).  The use of 
ESAMs indicates an erosion of the employment security social contract. 
 The shock of the 1978 oil crisis was absorbed by wage restraint and there were very few 
dismissals, voluntary or otherwise.(Nakamura, 1993)  LTE once again proved resilient with the 
                                                          
4 We do not argue that an employment security norm does not have some influence in small firms.  The literature, 
however, claims that LTE has been standard only for large firms.  This relates back to our discussion in the intro 
about the difficulty of determining the bounds of employment security norms. 
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help of ESAMs.  Transfers, early retirement, a shortened workweek (Price, 1997), and temporary 
and contract employment even within large firms were established as norms during the 
1970s.(Takahashi, 1997)  Thus, the life-span of full-fledged LTE, or LTE prior to these 
mechanisms of adjustment being established as norms, was only about a decade. 
 The 1980s was marked by another crisis that threatened LTE but also by an indication 
that LTE had spread beyond private-sector large companies.  In 1985 the yen appreciated 
drastically, seriously undercutting Japan’s competitiveness in export markets.  The move to 
transferring Japanese operations overseas, which had already been underway largely due to 
increasing labor costs at home, was accelerated (Nakamura, 1993) and the use of ESAMs by 
large Japanese firms increased.(Takahashi, 1997)  Voluntary retirement was widely used and, 
between voluntary retirement and mandated early retirement, the age at which LTE ended was 
effectively being reduced from 60 to between 50 and 59 for a large fraction of the segment of the 
workforce that was protected by it.(Takahashi, 1997)  Efforts by the government during the 
1980s provide evidence that the norm of employment security had spread beyond private-sector 
large companies.  When much of the Japanese public sector was privatised during the late 1980s, 
not one employee was dismissed.(Sako, 1997)  Employee levels were reduced through 
rationalisation and personnel transfer to related companies.(Sako, 1997) 
 Although employment security of some core employees in large Japanese firms was 
undermined in the 1980s, employment opportunities for other core employees increased during 
this decade of labor shortage.  While large Japanese firms had previously hired people straight 
out of school, many of them began recruiting workers away from firms.(Lincoln, 1997)  In 
response, many “life-time” employees switched employers.(Lincoln, 1997)  Thus while Japanese 
employers had weakened employment security norms for over a decade by this time, some 




The case of Korea to the early 1990s 
Korean industrial relations were generally cooperative up until the late 1980s.  However, 
this cooperation seemed to result less from any consensus between workers and their employers, 
as it had in Japan, than it did from a series of authoritarian “Republics” that prevented the 
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development of an independent labor movement.  Nonetheless, employment security has been a 
norm for workers in large Korean enterprises.  This raises the question of why these enterprises 
would adopt an inflexible employment practice as the norm.  An important part of the answer 
seems to lie in a patriarchal Korean culture and, more importantly, in the rapid and stable growth 
of large Korean enterprises that enabled them to conform to this culture.              
 The first Republic of Korea (ROK) was overthrown by student demonstrators in 1960.  
After a military coup toppled the second ROK in 1961 (Park and Lee, 1993), Park Chung-Hee, 
or General Park, led the third ROK for 18 years.  In order to assert greater control over Korea, 
Park dissolved all existing political organizations including the recently burgeoning trade unions, 
formed a federation of industrial unions known as the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(FKTU), and recognized FKTU as the sole authorized labor centre.(Singh, 1997)  FKTU 
generally did not resist the government’s attempts to control organized labor in order to satisfy 
Park’s developmentalist aims.(Mo, 1999)  Although protective labor legislation, such as the 
Labor Standards Act (LSA) of 1953 that makes it illegal for an employer to fire an employee 
without “just cause” (Kim, 1998), was generally not enforced at this time, repressive labor 
legislation enacted during this period served to legitimize repression of organized labor by the 
government.(Singh, 1997)  Still, organized labor was not passive during the 1960s, and working 
days lost because of labor disputes increased greatly.(Singh, 1997)  The Korean government 
responded with police and intelligence agency surveillance of the labor movement (Singh, 1997)  
as well as by frequently arresting and physically harming workers who disrupted business 
activities.(Vogel, 1997)  This heavy-handed intervention in labor markets helped to enable a 
stable supply of cheap labor with minimal rights, which was critical to Korea’s rapid economic 
growth in 1960s-1980s.(Park, 1993)   
The Korean government’s heavy-handed intervention in the economy extended beyond 
labor markets.  Exercising almost total control over the financial system, this government both 
directed nationalized banks to lend to high performing companies within industries it selected for 
development and encouraged these companies to diversify their product lines.(Clifford, 1997)  
As a result a small group of large, highly diversified conglomerates (Chaebol) emerged.  As 
Korea proceeded through a highly successful period of export-oriented industrialization in the 
1960s and 1970s, the Chaebol became a dominant force in the modern sector of the Korean 
economy.  Chaebols’ sustained growth over coming decades kept pressures to retrench at a 
 10
minimum and left them with little reason to violate Korean patriarchal norms that made 
retrenchment a source of embarrassment for employers.(Mitchell, 1988)  The resulting Chaebol 
practice of not retrenching workers helped to establish employment security as the norm for 
Korean large businesses.5/6(Lee, 2000)  Despite Korea’s patriarchal culture, there has been no 
norm of employment security in the Korean small and medium sectors.  These sectors, which in 
1992 accounted for 65.8 percent of all employees in manufacturing (Mo, 1999), experienced 
greater business fluctuations and as a consequence developed more flexible practices of 
employment adjustment.(Lee, 2000)  Thus, by our somewhat stylized distinction between large 
Korean businesses practicing employment security and small/medium Korean businesses 
practicing employment flexibility, this statistic suggests that around 35% of manufacturing 
employees were protected by employment security in the early 1990s. 
 Over the course of the 1970s, an underground radical labor movement began to emerge 
that was independent of the officially sanctioned FKTU.  This labor movement pushed for both 
democratization and a more egalitarian distribution of the economic gains resulting from Korea’s 
rapid development.(Lee, 1991)  Despite being repressed by the Korean government, this 
movement grew rapidly.(Park, 1993)  Meanwhile, the Korean government privitised its public 
sector as part of a structural adjustment program.  When it privitized, no major retrenchment 
occurred.7(Park, 1993)  This suggests that, like in Japan, employment security norms in Korea 
were not limited to large private Korean businesses. 
 In 1987, partly in response to a major wave of political and economic strikes, a new 
Korean government announced that it would decentralize political authority and allow more 
democratic labor organization and activism.(Mo, 1999)  Labor disputes increased dramatically 
(Lee, 1991) and wage gains, which had already been rapid for many years, outstripped 
productivity gains over the next few years.(Vogel, 1997)  Thus, as was the case with Japanese 
enterprises, Korean enterprises were no longer as competitive in domestic or export markets as 
they once had been and so were losing market share to later industrializers such as Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia.  This threatened to end the period of large Korean firms’ sustained 
                                                          
5 Because of the historically high rate of employee turnover in Korea, we do not refer to this norm as LTE.  
Turnover rates in Korean industry often averaged 4 –5% well into the 1980s.  In other words, 50 to 60 percent of a 
firm’s workforce might change over the course of a year.(Vogel, 1997) 
6 We are not able to give a precise estimate for when employment security became established as a norm in Korean 
large businesses. 
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growth, growth that had enabled employment security to become the norm for workers in these 
firms.  Furthermore, the fraction of Korean workers with secure employment was decreasing 
toward the end of the 1980s while the fraction of the workforce with temporary or daily 
employment was increasing.(Korea Labor Institute, 1999).8  Reflecting this, some of the ESAMs 
that were widespread in Japan from the 1970s seemed to be gaining prominence in Korea at this 
time. Korean companies began to hire more daily workers (Park, 1993) and to contract work out 
under a system known as the “small president system” (Verma, 1995)9. Also, temp agencies 
emerged and began to spread, with the workers they employed known as dispatched 
workers.(Verma, 1995) 
 While employment security norms seemed to be under threat following Korea’s rapid 
democratization that began in 1987, in a number of ways democratization may have bolstered 
these norms.  The government, now subject to more pressure from below, began enforcing 
legislation concerning employment security more strictly.(Kim, 1998)  Also, the LSA was 
revised in 1989; whereas before it was illegal for employers in enterprises with 10 or more 
workers to retrench without “just cause”, the number was revised down to 5 in 1989.(Fields, 
1989).  Furthermore, the previously underground labor union movement emerged above ground 
to form a new labor union confederation (KCTU) in 1990.(Park, 1993)  KCTU provided a more 
independent voice for labor than FKTU, which was still aligned with the government.  Finally, a 
new tripartite council that included labor representation was inaugurated in 1990.(Kim, 1998)  
This held out the possibility that labor would gain a greater say in government and in the 
economy and thereby perhaps help to stave off moves toward employment flexibility.10
 
 
The case of India to the early 1990s 
 The origin of the norm of employment security in India has been traced back to the 
independence period11, when the Indian public sector viewed employment creation and retention 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 This parallels the case of privitisation in Japan.  However, as we will see, this does not parallel the cases of 
privitisation in China and India, where the public sectors have made up larger shares of the economy. 
8 This trend continues.(Korea Labor Institute, 1999) 
9 This system had existed since the early 1920s in the mining sector.  However, only in this period was it introduced 
in the manufacturing sector.(Verma, 1995) 
10 The KCTU was not yet recognized by the Korean government and so only the less independent FKTU 
participated in the tri-partite council at this time. 
11 India attained independence from Britain in 1947. 
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as a responsibility.(SAAT, 1996)  At the time it was expected that a majority of workers would 
soon be absorbed into the modern sector and that public sector employment norms would be 
adopted by the rest of the modern sector.(SAAT, 1996)  The norm of employment security in 
India may have also originated in close ties between Indian organized labor and Indian 
politicians forged during the independence struggle (De Sousa, 1999), which could have 
influenced later government policy concerning public sector employment.  Still, no Indian labor 
legislation of this era required employers to provide workers with employment security 
(Kuruvilla and Hiers, 1997), and we have found no indication in the literature that the private 
sector was providing employment security at this time. 
India’s development strategy enabled Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), which 
comprise much of the public sector, to provide their employees with employment security.  This 
strategy was based in state-led, import-substituting industrialization (ISI).  India’s ISI strategy 
included large tariff barriers, subsidies for domestic industries, the creation of oligopolistic 
markets by the state, and reservations of industries for either the public sector or for the private 
sector.  This all ensured that many Indian markets were captive, non-competitive ones.  Without 
the pressures of domestic or foreign competition, it was much easier to pay the cost of providing 
employment security and to pass this cost on to Indian consumers in the form of higher 
prices.(SAAT, 1996) 
The scope of employment security was extended into the private sector through changes 
in labor laws during the 1970s and early 1980s.  The Contract Labor Act (1970) made it more 
difficult to indefinitely employ workers on contract, though this act has not been uniformly 
enforced.(Sastry, 1991)  More significantly, in 1976 the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) was 
amended so that enterprises employing 300 or more workers must get government permission to 
close or to retrench any workers, and in 1982 this was changed to 100 or more workers.(SAAT, 
1996)  Unlike the Contract Labor Act, IDA has generally been better enforced. Amendments to 
IDA in the 1970s and 1980s ended the period in which Indian employers had total control over 
their employment levels.  While employment security became the norm in the public sector 
because of the public sector’s views from independence and possibly because of ties between 
unions and political parties, the norm was now legally mandated in both the public and private 
sectors.  Ironically, it was only shortly after the 1982 amendment to the IDA that India began its 
shift away from ISI and toward export oriented industrialization (EOI) and domestic competition 
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and thereby seemed to make the provision of employment security more difficult in the public 
and private sectors alike. 
As a result of the shift toward EOI and domestic competition, Indian firms were under 
pressure to fire redundant labor, of which there was plenty.(SAAT, 1996)  Sick Industries and 
Companies Act (SICA) of 1985 was another bad omen for employment security.  It aimed at 
bringing about either restructuring or closure of poorly performing enterprises.    This 
contradicted IDA which, in the name of employment security, effectively discouraged shutting 
enterprises down regardless of their performance.  In coming years, this legal contradiction 
served as a de jure test of employment security norms’ strength in India’s large public sector and 
private sector firms.  On this de jure test, the social contract fared well.  IDA continued to force 
sick enterprises to remain open while SICA failed to enable sick enterprises to shut down.  
However, since the 1980s there has been an ongoing de facto test of the employment security 
social contract in India.  The 1980s was marked by an increase in the use of ESAMs, including 
subcontracting, temporary work, and contract work.(Ramaswamy, 1997; Bhattacherjee, 1999; 
Bose, 1996)  This increase suggests that, despite faring well on its de jure test, the Indian 
employment security social contract has not fared so well on its de facto test. 
To some extent, an increase in the use of ESAMs can be understood as not a de facto 
failing of the social contract but rather as an attempt to maintain the employment security of core 
workers during a period of dramatic economic change.  However, some of the Indian ESAMs, 
including breaking up firms so that they will not come under the purview of the IDA (Kuruvilla 
and Hiers, 1997), effectively strip core workers of their employment security.  Moreover, an 
increase in the use of ESAMs reflects a change in the acceptance of the social contract by the 
direct parties to the contract.  Originally, both direct parties to the social contract, namely public 
sector employees who benefited from it and the public sector that provided it despite not being 
legally mandatd to, accepted this contract.  However, there is no indication that the private sector 
would have adopted the practice of providing employment security just when, it seems, it was 
most difficult to do so.  Also, the expansion of the use of ESAMs around the time that large 
private sector firms were mandated by law to provide employment security indicates that the 
private sector never accepted the norm of employment security but rather attempted to subvert it 
from the start.  Thus, an increase in the use of ESAMs in the Indian case should not be seen as an 
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attempt to maintain employment security for core workers but rather as an attempt to circumvent 
restrictive labor law. 
Although in the independence era it was expected that most workers would soon be 
absorbed into the modern sector, this did not happen.  In both 1971 and 1981 the modern sector 
employed 9.5% of the Indian non-agricultural workforce and by 1991 this had decreased to 
8.8%.(Varma et al., 1997)  By amending the IDA in the 1970s and 1980s, the percentage of 
workers within the modern sector who were covered by de jure employment security increased.  
However, this percentage of workers covered merely became a larger fraction of a small 
percentage somewhat under 10%.  Thus, Indian workers covered by protective labor legislation, 
including legislation concerning employment security, did not turn out to be the vanguard of a 
prosperous working class but rather an oasis of relative prosperity within a much larger body of 
poor, insecure, unprotected workers. 
 
The case of China to the early 1990s 
As in Japan, a minority of laborers in China have benefited from a non-legislated norm of 
life-time employment (LTE) (Verma and Zhiming, 1995), while employment for the majority of 
workers in both countries has been less secure.  However, while in Japan core employees in large 
private enterprises have had LTE, in China for most of the period following the 1949 communist 
revolution there has been essentially no private enterprise.  It is core employees generally in 
large, urban state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have had LTE in China.  The Chinese system of 
the state providing core SOE employees with LTE is sometimes known as the iron rice bowl 
(IRB)12.  The origin of LTE in Chinese industry is not entirely clear.  It may be in the mid-1950s, 
when the Communist Party converted many private industrial and commercial enterprises into 
SOEs by nationalizing them.  Although SOEs were the primary site of the IRB, not all workers 
in SOEs had this.  Most large factories employed a core of regular unionized workers and a 
periphery of temporary and contract nonunionized workers.(Lockett and Littler, 1983)  The core 
workers had employment security while the peripheral workers did not.  During the late 1950s, 
27% of the urban industrial labor force was peripheral.(Lockett and Littler, 1983) 
                                                          
12 The iron rice bowl is sometimes defined more broadly, including a host of benefits that were received by regular 
state employees in China. 
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In the mid-1960s the Chinese government implemented an ESAM, the worker-peasant 
system, that pared down the size of the core workforce in SOEs even further.  It did this by 
instructing all state-owned enterprises to hire less new permanent employees and to transfer less 
temporary or contract workers to permanent status.(Walder, 1986)  Thus the worker-peasant 
system reduced the number of workers who would attain IRB and the employment security that 
was a part of it.(Sheehan, 1998)  This system was implemented and orchestrated by the state.  
Doing so undermined the legitimacy of the state in some workers’ eyes, as evidenced by the 
militancy generated in the late 1960s by the consolidation of the worker-peasant 
system.(Sheehan, 1998)  Although unions, comprised of core SOE workers, would presumably 
be weakened by the worker-peasant system, they did not lead this militancy.  This is no surprise 
given that Chinese unions are mere extensions of the government that serve as a “conveyor belt” 
between workers and the state, helping to bring about state production and education goals while 
informaing the state about the needs of workers.(Littler and Lockett, 1983)     
 In 1978 China abandoned its period of import-substituting industrialization and embarked 
upon an economic path that further eroded the IRB.  Deng Xiaoping decided to begin gradually 
opening China to the external economy.  This exposed China to global economic forces that it 
was previously largely insulated from and precipitated a move toward aligning Chinese 
economic policy and industrial organization to the demands of those forces.  In the words of the 
CCP, it precipitated a move from a planned socialist economy to a planned commodity 
economy.(Han and Morishima, 1992)  The IRB was undermined in two primary ways during the 
early stages of China’s broad economic liberalization.   First, changes in industrial organization 
resulted in the growth of new forms of insecure employment.  These include the development of 
Special Economic Zones and Town and Village Enterprises, both sites of insecure employment 
(Sargeson, 1999), as well as the rapid growth of the private sector, also a site of insecure 
employment.(Qi, 1996)  Second, the thrust of the worker-peasant system was re-enforced by the 
Contract-Labor System (CLS) to make employment in SOEs even more insecure.  While the 
worker peasant system reduced the number of workers who would attain the employment 
security of IRB, CLS brought this number down to zero.  It did this by forbidding SOEs from 
hiring new permanent workers or shifting temporary or contract workers to permanent 
status.(Han and Morishima, 1992)  If CLS is fully implemented, it will result in a progressive 
move, as older permanent employees retire, toward the total absence of workers with the IRB.  
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That is, all SOE workers will be contract or temporary workers and so without LTE.  However, 
implementation of the CLS has been slow.(Sheehan, 1998)  There has been resistance to 
implementation of the CLS, and much of this resistance has stemmed from “general ideological 
principle.”(Sheehan, 1998: 207)  Resistance to the CLS has been cited as one reason that many 




 This section traced the origins and development through the 1980s of employment 
security norms in our four country cases.  In all four countries these norms significantly 
influenced both expectations and actions.  Employment security norms were enabled in these 
countries in different ways, including through rapid growth in Japan and Korea and through 
import substitution industrialization strategies in China and India.  In all countries the norms 
benefited directly a minority but crucial and unionized segment of the workforce.  Also, in all 
countries, employment security norms were under pressure for much of the period of their 
existence.  We will now examine the intensification of this pressure in the 1990s and the effects 
of this intensified pressure on employment security norms in each of our country cases.  
 
 
Development of Social Contracts From the Early 1990s to the Present  
 
The case of Japan from the early 1990s to the present 
In the early 1990s, Japan’s bubble economy of the 1980s burst.  Stock and real estate 
values declined rapidly in the early 1990s and remained at low levels throughout the decade.   
Growth rates averaged 3.5% from 1985 to 1992 but only .6% between 1992 and 1995 (Benson, 
1998) and have not increased since.  Unemployment which ranged 1-2% during the 1960s and 
1970s and 2- 3% during the 1980s (Benson, 1998) was up to 3.2% in 1995, 4.4% in 1999, and a 
record 4.7% in early 2000.(Associated Press, 3/15/2000).  As with the oil crises of the 1970s and 
the yen appreciation of the 1980s, poor economic performance in the 1990s precipitated the 
erosion of LTE.  However, the performance of the Japanese economy during the 1990s seemed 
to suggest an even graver threat to LTE than in previous decades.  There emerged in the 1990s 
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pessimism about aspects of Japanese industrial organization and practices, including both the 
keiretsu system of cross-shareholding among member corporations of a business group as well as 
LTE.(Sako and Sato, 1997)  Some developments since the early 1990s reflect this pessimism and 
bode poorly for LTE while other developments since then suggest an enduring strength of LTE. 
 Numerous developments since the early 1990s bode poorly for LTE.  First, there is a new 
reluctance among firms within keiretsu networks to bail out troubled affiliates.(Lincoln and 
Nakata, 1997)  Thus, poorly performing Japanese firms, which are currently very numerous, are 
less likely to be enabled though the support of other firms in their keiretsu network to forego 
retrenching core employees.(Lincoln and Nakata, 1997)  Second, a rationalization of the white-
collar workforce is occurring.(Sako and Sato, 1997)  Whether this will result in the demise of 
LTE among white-collar workers or, as with the earlier blue-collar rationalization, simply an 
erosion of this norm is not yet clear.  Third, employment institutions that promote insecure 
employment, such as outplacement services, are booming.(Australian Financial Review, 
1/18/99).13  Fourth, the Japanese Labor Ministry is liberalizing the job placement industry.  
Whereas agencies in this industry previously were able to offer their services only in the blue-
collar market, now they are also able to do so in the white-collar market.(Australian Financial 
Review, 1/18/99)  Fifth, the number of Japanese with temporary jobs has been rising on a 
monthly basis since September of 1996 while the number of Japanese with permanent 
employment had declined for 25 straight months as of February 2000.(Dow Jones, 2/28/00)  
Sixth, the number of Japanese leaving their jobs involuntarily is rising.(Dow Jones, 2/28/000)  
Seventh, the transfer of workers from large firms to small firms has escalated in recent years, and 
small firms are less likely than large firms to be sites of LTE.(Lincoln, 1997)  Eighth, major 
employers such as Nissan, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi have recently announced major restructuring 
plans that will result in the loss of thousands of jobs.(The Straits Times, 1/21/2000) 
Other developments since the early 1990s suggest an enduring strength of the LTE norm.  
First, Rengo, the largest Japanese union confederation, became an important actor in national 
politics during the 1990s.(Kume, 1998)  Rengo strongly resists retrenchment, and its new power 
in national politics may help Rengo to resist the erosion of LTE.(Rengo, 1998)  Second, 
Nikkeiren, the largest Japanese employer confederation, is making some efforts to maintain 
                                                          
13 On a related note, Rengo, the largest Japanese union confederation, recently set up a temp agency.  Rengo’s aim 
in doing this is to find jobs for people laid off due to restructuring and bankruptcies and to protect temps from 
abuses.(Daily Yomiuri, 10/24/99) 
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LTE.(Daily Yomiuri, 1/19/2000)14  Third, the Ministry of Labor has resisted attempts by firms to 
reduce their workforces more than it thinks they should.(Lincoln, 1997)  Fourth, even when 
shrinking their workforces, at least some Japanese firms continued to avoid outright 
retrenchment well into the 1990s.  For instance, managers at Japan’s top five iron and steel firms 
reduced employment by one-quarter between 1993 and 1996 without dismissing a single 
worker.(Gordon, 1998)  Fifth, the norm of employment security is still held in high esteem; both 
workers and managers remain deeply attached to LTE.(Sako and Sato, 1997)  Sixth, LTE for 
core employees has the powerful force of inertia on its side.(Sako and Sato, 1997) 
Overall, although it seems likely that the erosion of LTE will continue, it is not yet clear 
that LTE will disappear as a norm guiding a substantial fraction of Japanese employment 
relationships.  Erosion of LTE began roughly in the 1970s, the same time that the most rapid 
phase of Japan’s postwar growth ended.  Erosion of LTE has not abated since then, and it will 
probably not do so unless a similarly rapid phase of growth begins anew.  Even if Japan does not 
again achieve such rapid growth, LTE is not necessarily doomed.  Growth in the 1970s and 
1980s was slower than growth in the 1950s and 1960s,  and though this slower growth 
culminated in some ESAMs it did not culminate in LTE’s death.  Current threats to LTE are 
emerging in a period of non-growth.  Yet if growth were to resume at even a moderate pace these 
threats may take on less significance. 
 
The case of Korea from the early 1990s to the present 
The tripartite council formed in 1990 gave Korean organized labor a greater voice in 
policymaking and helped to stabilize industrial relations in Korea.  Although confrontational 
labor relations continued to be pervasive, labor disputes declined and strikes became more 
moderate.(Kim and Chang, 1998)  However, Korean organized labor lost much of its voice in 
policymaking during the mid 1990s.(Keun Song, 1999)  Meanwhile, Korea further integrated 
with global markets.  As a member of the WTO (launched in 1994), Korea’s ability to use tariffs 
and subsidies decreased, thus increasing competitive pressures on Korean firms.  Furthermore, in 
order to join the OECD the Korean government had promised to revise its labor laws to conform 
                                                          
14 Nikkeiren is making this effort and calling for Rengo to agree to wage restraint in return.  It is also advocating 
work-sharing schemes in which workers work less and are paid proportionally less.(Daily Yomiuri, 1/19/2000)    
Rengo consistently denies that wage restrain is necessary.  Nonetheless, Rengo has accepted three straight record-
low pay raises in Japan’s annual labor negotiations.(Reuters, 3/15/00) 
 19
with more flexible OECD standards by the end of 1996.(KEF, 1997)  International pressure was 
brought to bear on the Korean government to fulfill this promise.(KEF, 1997)15
Although labor relations had stabilized since 1990, attempts by the Korean government to 
increase de jure employment flexibility posed the threat of jeopardizing this stability and 
provoking a militant labor response similar to the one during the democratization of the late 
1980s.  This was an especially contentious issue since labor legislation was of increasing 
importance to upholding the norm of employment security.  In order to increase employment 
flexibility without provoking such a response, the Korean government re-included organized 
labor in the policy-making process via the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations 
Reform, formed in May of 1996.(KEF, 1997)  The purpose of the Commission was to prepare a 
report for the President that could serve as the basis for labor legislation reform.(KEF, 1997)  
Even the militant and independent KCTU was given representation in the Commission, despite 
the fact that the Korean government did not yet recognize the KCTU.  While the Commission 
meetings dragged on for 6 months, the KCTU threatened to secede and the FKTU stated that it 
expected nothing to get accomplished.(KEF, 1997)  The FKTU was correct, as the Commission 
agreed on virtually nothing and submitted an unfinished report to the President in November of 
1996.(KEF, 1997)  Based upon this, the Korean national legislature passed labor law reforms 
which influenced de jure employment security much less than originally intended.  Whereas the 
proposed bill originally granted employers broad rights to lay off surplus workers, the new law 
merely allowed layoffs in emergencies, such as bankruptcy.(KEF, 1997)  Furthermore, by the 
new labor law retrenchment would continue to require government approval.(KEF, 1997) 
Shortly following the Commission and the related labor law reform, Korea was hit by the 
Asian Financial Crisis.  The Korean government requested and received aid from the IMF.  The 
IMF then pressured Korea to reduce fiscal expenditures and restructure its banking 
industry.(Kim and Chang, 1998)  Furthermore, as when attempting to join the OECD, the IMF 
pressured Korea to increase employment flexibility, which was seen as critical in attracting 
foreign capital.16(KLI, 1999)  Korea then it set up a third tri-partite commission with the purpose, 
                                                          
15 Korea did join the OECD on December 12, 1996. 
16 The soundness of the IMF’s prescriptions for Korea and the other recipients of IMF aid during the crisis has been 
seriously undermined.  Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs, and most recently Joseph Stiglitz (chief economist at the 
World Bank during the Crisis) have all called into question these prescriptions, which now seem more a part of the 
Washington Consensus, US Treasury Department, IMF bureaucratic functionaries, and third-rate IMF economists 
than they do the more historically informed and empirically considerate kind of neoclassical economics. 
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as with the second commission, of forming a consensus on how to flexibilize labor which could 
serve as the basis for changes in labor legislation.  Since this third commission operated during 
the Crisis, it had a greater imperative to act. 
The Commission, which was composed of political representatives, managerial 
representatives, and representatives of both the KCTU and FKTU, agreed upon various reforms.  
Reforms that benefited organized labor but did not directly pertain to employment security 
included officially recognizing the KCTU, collective bargaining rights for the public sector, and 
the freedom of labor unions to be politically active.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  The focus of 
the Commission, though, was a dual strategy for bringing greater numerical flexibility to the 
Korean labor market.  This dual strategy was on one hand labor law revisions to permit layoffs in 
limited circumstances and to permit the use of temporary labor for periods up to one year and on 
the other hand a social safety net composed of a new unemployment insurance fund and 
increased unemployment benefits to lessen the blow of layoffs and lessen the insecurity 
associated with temporary labor.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  Soon after the Commission 
came to agreement on all these measures the KCTU threatened to hold a nationwide strike if the 
agreement was not renegotiated.(WSJ, 2/11/98)  The national assembly ignored this threat and 
quickly wrote the terms of the agreement into law in February of 1998.(Kim and Chang, 1998) 
The Crisis took a major toll on employment in Korea, though workers with employment 
security did not bear the brunt of this.  The unemployment rate rose from 2.1% in October of 
1997 to 8.6% in February of 1998.(Fields, 1999)  However, a mere 5.7% of workers among the 
unemployed had worked in establishments with more than three hundred employees, 
establishments where union representation is very high.(Fields, 1999)  Temporary and daily 
workers accounted for the bulk of the unemployed, and 61% of the unemployed had worked in 
small establishments employing fewer than ten workers.(Fields, 1999)  The fact that workers in 
small firms and contingent laborers took most of the hit of the Crisis and its aftermath suggests a 
resilience of the employment security norm in Korea.  This norm has only ever been prevalent in 
the large Chaebol.  There are a few reasons to believe it will continue to be prevalent there.  
First, employment security in the Chaebol has a long tradition, and thus the norm has inertia on 
its side.(Lee, 2000)  Second, job security agreements became the primary collective bargaining 
issue in 1998.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  Thus, unions are putting a lot of emphasis on the 
maintenance of the employment security norm.  As a result, several companies have recently 
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attempted to guarantee some degree of job security (e.g. Daewoo Precision, Inchon Steel, and 
Korean Telecommunication).(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  Third, attempts to lay off core 
workers have been met by a wave of strikes (Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000), thereby making 
retrenchment of core workers a less attractive option for employers.  Fourth, growth is back in 
Korea.  Korea grew by 10.2% in 1999 and is expected to grow by 7.7% in 2000.(FT, 4/28/00)  
Associated with this, unemployment has come down from its high of 8.6% in February of 1998 
to 4.6% in October of 1999.(Fields, 1999)17
Despite indications that bode well for the endurance of the employment security norm in 
Korea, there are also indications that bode poorly for this.  First, even within the Chaebol, 
downsizing, lay-offs, and early retirement have emerged as new trends since the crisis 
began.(Lee, 2000)  Second, the size of the workforce with permanent employment continues to 
shrink.  In 1998, the number of permanent wage workers shrank by 10.6%.(Fields, 1999)  
Meanwhile, the number of temporary and daily workers continues to rise.(KLI, 1999)  Finally, 
given the post-1987 power of organized labor, it is not clear whether Korea will be able to make 
adjustment necessary to remain competitive in global markets.  This power has enabled 
organized labor to successfully bargain for higher wages and continued numerical inflexibility, 
which undermine Korea’s competitiveness in both domestic markets, which have successively 
been opened up by the WTO, and export markets.  In a sense, the Crisis precipitated a 
gargantuan, economy-wide ESAM.  This ESAM has been for Korean business en totem to back 
down in the face of organized labor militance while retrenching underprivileged labor (And 
white collar and managerial staff) en masse.  Even aside from ethical considerations but rather as 
a practical matter, it is not clear whether this kind of ESAM will enable privileged Korean 
laborers to either stave off further erosion of the employment security norm or even to prevent its 
demise. 
 
The case of India from the early 1990s to the present 
The 1990s brought dramatic change to the Indian economic environment.  In 1991, 
following a balance of payments crisis, the government of India agreed to implement an IMF 
structural adjustment program (SAP) in exchange for emergency credit.  This SAP culminated in 
                                                          
17 This is still nowhere near the pre-crisis level of 2.1%.  Furthermore, the 4.6% figure does not include those who 
have left the labor force in frustration at the poor employment prospects following the crisis.(Fields, 1999) 
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India’s New Economic Policy, or NEP.  Two important aspects of the NEP are a reduction of 
fiscal deficits and a reduction in tariff-levels.  Both of these aspects accelerated India’s move 
away from its earlier economic environment conducive to employment security.  Reducing fiscal 
deficits undermines employment security by putting pressure on PSUs’ budgets and thereby 
making it more difficult for PSUs to retain redundant workers.  Reducing tariff levels 
undermines employment security by opening up Indian markets to domestic competition.  As a 
result of this competition, Indian public firms and private firms are under more pressure to 
reduce excess expenditures, including by retrenching redundant workers. 
 The IMF SAP was not the only instance from the 1990s of foreign involvement in Indian 
affairs promoting employment flexibility.  As a second instance, the World Bank, and many 
foreign investors, (as well as some, but not all Indian employers) have pressured the Indian 
government to allow an “exit policy”, or a policy by which employers can retrench industries or 
close plants.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  A tripartite committee formed for the purpose of 
developing an exit policy recommended the creation of a safety net for training retrenched 
workers and for retrenchment compensation.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  However, as was 
the case in Korea, unions have had misgivings about this tripartite committee.(Bhattacherjee, 
1999)  Furthermore, amendments to legislation that would enable an exit policy have not been 
passed.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000) 
 Aside from the NEP and foreign pressures for greater employment flexibility, there were 
other signs that the norm of employment security was under threat in India during the 1990s.  
First, with the move of Indian political parties toward more liberalized economic policies, there 
has been a weakening of ties between union federations and political parties.(De Sousa, 1999)  
These ties had traditionally been strong and had enabled organized labor to attain many benefits, 
including employment security.  Furthermore, as the government-union coalition has weakened, 
the government business coalition has strengthened.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  This bodes 
especially poorly for organized labor since, as discussed above, there is no indication that the 
Indian private sector ever supported the employment security norm, and this sector will likely 
use their closer ties with government to further undermine this norm.  Second, the number of 
sectors of the economy reserved for PSUs has been reduced.(Kuruvilla and Hiers, 1997)  Since 
PSUs have been a bastion of employment security, reducing the number of sectors reserved for 
PSUs undermines employment security.  Third, in order to avoid unions, firms are increasingly 
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opening Greenfield non-union plants.(Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2000)  Without unions, workers in 
these plants will be less able to resist erosion of employment security norms.  Fourth, employers 
are increasingly bargaining for greater employment flexibility.  A recent study covering 300 
collective bargaining agreements in the Indian private sector found that one of two included 
provisions for greater flexibility.(Venkataratnam, 1997) Fifth, the continuing move toward a 
larger fraction of contingent workers in the workforce accelerated in the 1990s.(Dev, 2000)  
Sixth, the National Labor Commission was set up in the 1990s with the aim of rationalizing and 
flexibilizing national labor law.(Bhattacherjee, 1999) 
 Despite many signs that the employment security norm is under threat in India, some 
signs suggest at the resilience of this norm.  For instance, the National Labor Commission has 
not yet succeeded in rationalizing or flexibilizing national labor law.(Bhattacherjee, 2000)  This 
underscores that, despite the weakening of relations between the Indian government and 
organized labor, these relations are still strong enough to slow reform.  Second, redundancy is 
greatest in the public sector.  In fact, only 12.9% of redundant employees work in the private 
sector.(SAAT, 1996)  This bodes well for the employment security norm since public sector 
unions are more effective than private sector unions at avoiding restructuring.(Kuruvilla and 
Hiers, 1997)  Third, unions have been relatively successful at resisting privitization.(Candland, 
1996)  Although the first partial privitization of a PSU occurred in 1991 (Candland, 1996), little 
occurred in following years.(Dev, 2000) 
 It seems there are more signs that the employment security norm is under threat in India 
than there are signs of this norm’s resilience.  Nonetheless, many Indian workers are still covered 
by de jure employment security and so employment security is still a significant factor in India 
industrial relations.  In 1996, there were 22 million workers covered by employment security, 4.4 
million of whom were redundant.(SAAT, 1996)  Furthermore, restructuring through the NRF 
program was not met by masses of workers giving up their secure employment.(SAAT, 1996)  
Part of the reason for this is the VRS does not provide adequate incentive to voluntarily retire.  
Monetary incentives are low.18(SAAT, 1996)  Another reason is the slow growth of employment 
in India’s formal sector.(SAAT, 1996)  Thus, workers who take voluntary retirement then have 
little opportunity to get a job outside of the informal sector, where work conditions and 
compensation are much worse than in the formal sector.  Some have called for increasing the 
                                                          
18 Golden handshakes are pewter at best. 
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incentives for redundant workers to sign up for the VRS.(SAAT, 1996)  There has also recently 
been more talk of developing a social safety net for workers retrenched due to 
privitization.(Economic Times, 3/24/00)  This parallels the Korean post-Crisis experience, when 
a social safety net was developed at the same time that employment flexibility was increased.  
Also similar to the Korean experience, this net would be devised for organized sector workers 
who are retrenched, not for workers who had no employment security to start with.  Aside from 
India’s prospective social safety net, the NRF, too, cushions the blow of retrenchment only for 
organized sector workers.19(SAAT, 1996) 
  By the end of the 90s the prospects for employment security in India had dimmed.  After 
the central government was toppled a few times within a few years, the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) has finally established a relatively stable coalition at the center.  This is significant for 
employment security norms because the BJP is squarely backing rapid liberalization.  
Furthermore, the Congress Party, which is the major opposition party, has expressed that it will 
not resist BJP efforts to liberalize.  In this environment conducive to liberalization, the central 
government recently accelerated the stalled privitization drive.20  Also, a union-opposed major 
modification of a major piece of labor legislation has nearly made its way through parliament.21  
Thus recent indications from the center suggest the employment security norm in India will 
continue to be weakened.  From the mid-1980s into the 1990s, the social contract concerning 
employment security in India fared pretty well on its de jure test despite not faring well on its de 
facto test.  Recent indications suggest that this social contract will probably falter on its de jure 
test as well. 
 
 
The case of China from the early 1990s to the present 
By the early 1990s, China was in a legitimacy bind concerning employment security.  As 
with the consolidation of the worker-peasant system in the mid-1960s, the implementation of the 
CLS in the late 1980s resulted in strong resistance from workers who felt their employment 
security, or prospect for employment security, was being undercut.  This resistance was a 
                                                          
19 The NRF also provides resources for employment generation schemes in the unorganized sector.(SAAT, 1996)  
However, it provides no benefits specifically geared toward unorganized sector workers who are retrenched. 
20 Modern Foods was sold to Hindustan Lever and Indian Airlines was put on the blocks.  
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testament to the strength of the employment security norm for SOE workers in China.  In the 
terms of this paper, it was an instance of employers undermining their legitimacy (in the eyes of 
their employees) by attempting to revoke the social contract concerning employment security.  
However, by the 1990s China had gradually moved along the path toward a more liberal and 
open economy for over a decade and this had increased China’s rate of GNP growth 
substantially.(Rawski, 1999)  However, it had also progressively undermined the IRB, and 
continued high rates of growth seemed to demand more of this.(Hannan, 1998)  Throughout the 
1990s, the CCP attempted to balance the legitimacy constraints of the need to ensure continuing 
rapid growth and the need to satisfy SOE workers. 
 During the 1990s there was no indication that new employment in the emerging market 
environment would help to rekindle the norm of employment security.  Formal employment 
growth outpaced labor force growth until 1995, from which point formal employment remained 
essentially stable in absolute terms while declining rapidly relative to informal employment as a 
share of the workforce.(Rawski, 1999)  However, even formal employment was no longer 
secure.  Temp workers were the fastest expanding sector of employees in SOEs.(Sargeson, 1999)  
By 1994, 26% of the SOE workforce was on contract.(Sargeson, 1999)22  The fastest growing 
sources of formal employment during the 1990s were private enterprises and town and village 
enterprises (TVEs), neither of which are bastions of employment security.  Overall, the 
percentage of urban workers on contract increased from 12% in 1990 to 41% in 1996.(Sargeson, 
1999)  However, as with in SOEs, many workers in the rapidly growing private enterprises and 
TVEs in the 1990s were not even on contract but were instead temps.(Sargeson, 1996) 
 As new insecure employment emerged in China during the 1990s, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) sent signals that old secure employment would not last.  At the Third 
Plenum meeting of the CCP in 1993, the CCP announced that China was officially switching to a 
market economy.(Prokopenko, 1999)  Then in 1996, the CCP decreed that creating employment 
was not the Party’s major task.(Hannan, 1998)  Meanwhile, urban unemployment rose from 
3.7% in 1993 to 7% in 1997.23(Rawski, 1999)  Part of this rise stemmed from the relaxing of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Modification of the Trade Unions Act has been passed by parliament and is awaiting notification.(Bhattacherjee, 
2000) 
22 Employment in SOEs increased from 103.5 million in 1990 to 110.4 million in 1997 though it declined as a share 
of the total urban workforce.(Sargeson, 1999)   
23 These figures are derived by Rawski from official CCP figures of urban unemployment, which are notoriously 
unreliable, by assuming that 40% of furloughed workers have obtained new jobs. 
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restrictions on rural urban migration and the consequential flood of urban areas by peasants.(Lu 
et al., 1997)  However, part of this also resulted from retrenchment in SOEs.  China has not 
pursued wholesale privitization of SOEs in their “gradualist” transition to a market 
economy.(O’Leary, 1998)  Instead, the CCP has endeavored to make SOEs more efficient 
through restructuring and bolstering of competitive forces.(O’Leary, 1998)  Yet in the mid 
1990s, this restructuring and stoking of competitiveness began to culminate in retrenchment en 
masse.  In 1996 the number of SOE workers retrenched reached 10 million.24(Prokopenko, 1999)  
In 1998 this figure was down to 6.1 million.(Associated Press, 3/29/99)  However, in 1999 it rose 
to 11.7 million SOE workers.(Reuters, 3/7/00)  The rate of redundancy in SOEs has been 
estimated at 30%, though generally without reference to a specific year.(Rawski, 1999; Hannan, 
1998)  Whether or not high levels of redundancy remain or retrenchment continues, mass SOE 
retrenchment in recent years suggests that the number of employees protected by the IRB is 
rapidly dwindling. 
 Although the significance of SOEs to the Chinese economy has declined25, the CCP 
continues to make some effort to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of SOE workers.  First, there 
has been some shifting of redundant SOE workers to subsidiaries in order to stave off outright 
dismissal.(Rawski, 1999)  This is analogous to the very prevalent Japanese ESAM of shifting 
redundant private workers to related subsidiaries.  Second, the CCP replaced the six-day work 
week in SOEs with a five-day work week in order to reduce the need for retrenchment.(Hannan, 
1998)  Third, China’s unemployment insurance system is being expanded to include more 
workers, workers who predominantly are employed in SOEs.(China Daily, 3/15/99)  Fourth, 
instead of always practicing outright dismissal, China has furloughed many redundant SOE 
workers since the early 1990s.  Furloughed workers do not report to work yet are paid a reduced 
salary while they seek new employment.26(Rawski, 1999)  Fifth, employment regulations were 
extended to include contract and temporary workers in 1995, the kinds of workers that 
retrenched SOE workers probably often end up as.(Sargeson, 1999)  However, these regulations 
are ignored with impunity.(Sargeson, 1999)  Sixth, the CCP is encouraging provincial 
                                                          
24 Compare this to the estimate cited above of 4.4 million total redundant workers in Indian PSUs in 1996.  China 
retrenched more than twice this amount in 1996 alone.  For better or worse, Indian democracy seems to slow brutal 
dislocations toward efficiency. 
25 SOEs accounted for three-quarters of industrial output in 1981 and only one-third in 1997.(Prokopenko, 1999) 
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governments to grow their job retraining programs for SOE workers who are 
retrenched.(Hannan, 1998)  Nonetheless, about one-half of those retrained do not find jobs.(Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 2/25/99) Seventh, China’s policy is to pay pensions to retrenched 
SOE workers, and the CCP has recently claimed it will raise these pensions.(Associated Press, 
8/28/99)  However, not long before it made this claim, the CCP was merely claiming it would 
pay at least 50% of those pensions it owed which it had heretofore failed to pay.(Associated 
Press, 4/13/99) 
 Despite these many efforts by the CCP to retain its legitimacy in the eyes of SOE 
employees, the failure of the CCP to ensure continuing employment for retrenched SOE workers 
or even to meet its pension obligations indicates the declining significance of SOE workers in the 
eyes of the CCP.  While SOE employment continues to shrink as a fraction of the total 
workforce, this significance will only decline further.  Furthermore, the fraction of SOE workers 
with the IRB will also likely continue to decline.  Predicting the future of the employment 
security social contract in China is easier than it is for the cases of Japan, Korea, or even India.  
Unless current or recent SOE workers mount a significant challenge to CCP rule, the CCP will 
continue to restructure SOEs in the hopes of maintaining China’s period of sustained rapid 
growth.  As the CCP continues to restructure SOEs, the last vestiges of the IRB and the 




We have discussed both the emergence of and undermining of the employment security 
norm among core workers in the modern industrial sectors of China, India, Japan, and South 
Korea.  We will now address the question of whether these norms will be completely eroded and 
the impact such erosion would have on core and periphery workforces in our country cases. 
A key question is whether there has been or will be a change from a system of 
employment marked by a core with the norm of employment security and a periphery without 
the norm of employment security to a system of employment marked by a norm of employment 
insecurity for essentially all workers.  Although the previous system has been undermined in all 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 In a sense, the furloughs can be seen as an ESAM.  They protect redundant workers while these workers seek new 
unemployment.  However, it is not clear what happens if such redundant workers do not find new employment or 
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four countries, it has not been entirely eradicated and thus there has not been a full shift to the 
latter system in any of the four countries.  Within the section concerning the 1990s above, we 
mentioned forces mitigating for and against continuation of employment security norms for each 
of the four countries.  Comparing the four countries in terms of both these forces and more 
general considerations, we suspect that there is some likelihood of these norms enduring to a 
significant extent in Japan and Korea but little likelihood of this in India and even less in China.  
In all four countries there has been a rapid rise in the size of the contingent workforce in recent 
years.  This indicates that the core workforce where employment security norms have prevailed 
in the past has likely shrunk in all countries, and if this trend continues employment insecurity 
will eventually prevail in all four countries.  On the other hand, employment security norms have 
the force of inertia on their side in all four countries.  This force probably has some significance 
in Japan and Korea.  Employment security for the core workforces in Japan and Korea has been, 
in combination with functional flexibility, part of an integrated industrial relations strategy 
geared toward quality and productivity.  This strategy has contributed to Japan and Korea’s 
longstanding success in export markets.  Furthermore, this strategy has been regarded by many 
as superior to other industrial relations strategies around the globe.(Smitka, 1991; Nishiguchi, 
1994)  Then again, Korea and Japan’s integrated industrial relations strategy that has included 
employment security for core workforces was highly successful when the Korean and Japanese 
markets were largely closed to foreign competition and when Korean and Japanese wage costs 
were much lower.  Whether it could remain competitive as the WTO continues to pry open these 
markets and as Japanese and Korean capital continues to move abroad in search of cheaper labor 
is anybody’s guess. 
  The force of inertia concerning employment security probably has less significance in 
China and India.  China and India pursued an ISI (import substitution industrialization)  strategy 
during much of the period when employment security norms prevailed in these countries.  
However, they are radically altering their economic strategies toward higher exports, and this 
will require much higher levels or quality and productivity.  Unlike in the cases of Japan and 
Korea, there is no Chinese or Indian precedent that suggests China or India could achieve high 
levels of quality and productivity under a system of employment that includes employment 
security for core workers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
how long they continue to receive an income as furloughed workers. 
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Recent economic events have posed variable threats to employment security norms in our 
four country cases.  These norms have come under major stress in Japan and Korea as a result of 
economic crises.  The Korean Chaebols responded to the Crisis by downsizing their workforces 
some and laying off some core workers.  Korea nonetheless emerged from the Crisis with 
employment security norms somewhat intact.  In some ways the Crisis actually underscored the 
strength of employment security norms protecting the core Korean workforce.  The peripheral 
workers suffered the brunt of the Crisis, including through mass retrenchment, while core union  
workers were largely spared (although not white collar and managerial employees).  
Furthermore, strong, independent, militant Korean unions struggled during and after the Crisis to 
preserve employment security norms, and they have succeeded in getting some Korean 
businesses to codify what have long been tacit employment security norms by writing them into 
collective bargaining agreements.  Japan is still suffering through its economic crisis and this 
crisis continues to be a major threat to employment security norms.  As opposed to the Korean 
case, Japanese unions, though strong at the workplace, have not successfully defended 
employment security norms during Japan’s economic crisis.  However, Japan’s largest union 
federation, Rengo, has recently gained strength and prominence in national politics, and is 
bringing about some consolidation in union structures to strengthen its base.   Furthermore, 
Rengo as well as Japan’s largest employers’ federation, Nikkeiren, the Japanese Ministry of 
Labor, and Japanese firms and workers are all making attempts to defend employment security 
norms.  Regardless of these attempts, changes in Japanese industrial organization may make LTE 
unsustainable.  As Japan increasingly relies on ESAMs, such as by shifting a growing number of 
core workers to small firms, keiretsu ties that enable many ESAM’s are weakening.  That is, a 
historically critical support for employment security norms is weakening at the time when it is 
needed most to defend these norms. 
To an even greater extent than in Korea and Japan, recent economic events have 
threatened employment security norms in India and China.  India and China have radically 
reoriented their development strategies toward greater openness, competitiveness, and growth, 
and this reorientation continues in both countries.  Retrenching redundant workers is widely 
regarded as an essential component of India’s NEP, and both the government and the primary 
opposition party support the NEP.  This is indicative of the weakening relationship between the 
government/political parties and unions, who generally oppose the NEP.  At the same time, the 
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relationship between the government/political parties and business, which strongly supports the 
NEP and numerical flexibility in particular, is becoming closer.  Thus, whereas in Japan’s 
ongoing crisis the critical ILR actors have shown some support for employment security norms, 
generally only unions have shown this support in India.  Although the Indian government has not 
yet legislated an undermining of extant employment security norms- and it is hesitant to do so 
given that strong union resistance may create a backlash that threatens its rule- many employers 
are either bargaining for retrenchment or craftily violating the spirit if not the letter of laws that 
restrict it.  As with India’s NEP, retrenching redundant workers is widely regarded as an 
essential component of China’s drive to achieve success in a globally integrated market 
economy.  However, unlike in the case of India, the Chinese government apparently does not 
have to contend with unions that could threatens its rule since Chinese unions are little more than 
an appendage of the Chinese government.  Still, in the past this government has faced the threat 
of revolt if it did not appease the critical core industrial workforce.  However, the Chinese 
government’s retrenchment in recent years of tens of millions of SOE workers indicates this is 
no longer a major threat, and it becomes an even smaller threat as the SOE workforce continues 
to shrink rapidly.  Thus while the Indian government and business have a good hand in their 
effort to undermine employment security in India, the Chinese government, in its effort to 
undermine employment security in China, holds all the cards.  In sum, China will likely soon 
achieve a system of employment marked by employment insecurity for essentially all workers.  
India is less likely to achieve this than China, but India is probably more likely to achieve it or to 
achieve it rapidly than is Japan or Korea. 
While the likelihood of a system of employment marked by employment insecurity for 
essentially all workers clearly varies for the countries we are examining, the effects of such a 
system for the core and peripheral workforces within these countries are not entirely clear.  
Neoclassical economists generally argue that employment security contributes to inflexibility 
that slows the growth of a nation’s economy and creates unemployment.  This reconciles well 
with the experiences of India and China during much of the postwar period, when low growth 
was matched by high unemployment.  However, some academics that focus on workplace 
institutions argue that employment security can, when part of specific broader institutional 
frameworks, increase productivity and contribute to growth.  This reconciles well with the 
experiences of Korea and Japan during much of the postwar period, when high growth was 
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matched by low unemployment.  For the sake of argument, assuming that employment security 
norms for core workers, (who have always been a minority in our country cases),  are having 
negative effects on growth and employment today, peripheral workers, (who have always been a 
majority), would seem to have at least two reasons to hope for the continued erosion of these 
norms.  First, governments would likely attempt to legitimate this erosion by devising 
components of a social safety net that benefits peripheral workers.  This has already happened in 
Korea, where the government recently devised an unemployment insurance scheme that covers 
some of these workers.  Second, continued erosion would lead to higher growth for the economy 
(the neo-classical argument) and possibly higher income for themselves while reducing the 
chance that they would face unemployment.  Core workers would have less reason than 
peripheral workers to hope for the continued erosion of employment security norms, at least over 
the short term.  However, even assuming this erosion would lead to higher growth and 
employment, it is not clear whether or not either core workers or peripheral workers would 
benefit from it.  To determine this, one would have to address the question of what  broader 
social ramifications a complete erosion of employment security norms would have, a difficult 
question that we will not address here.  One would also have to address the fact that unions are 
currently comprised of core workforces in China, India, Japan, and Korea.  Undermining core 
workforces by making their employment insecure could weaken unions and thereby weaken 
labor representation in business and political forums.  To the extent that strong labor 
representation in these forums benefits all workers, the complete erosion of core workforce 
employment security would harm both core and peripheral workforces.  For instance, labor 
legislation benefiting the entire workforce would less likely be passed.  Moreover, increased 
growth enabled by tearing up the core workforce’s employment-security social contract might 







In this comparative essay,  we examined the process of institutionalization of  the norm of 
employment security in four large Asian nations. The institutional features that supported the 
growth of this norm varied from country to country. In both India and China, large public sectors 
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under import substitution industrialization strategies were important institutional features that 
supported employment security. Further in India, supportive legislation given strong union-
political party relationships extended this norm to the private sector as well. In contrast, in Korea 
and Japan, the norm was developed by employers as a function of the need to develop strong 
internal labor markets.  The norm in these countries was also buttressed by strong economic 
growth  during the 1960-1990 period.  
The norm of employment security has eroded in all four countries in the 1980s and 1990s 
in particular. While economic crises contributed to this erosion, particularly in Japan and Korea, 
liberalization of the economies of China and India , and the consequent increase in competition 
and firm restructuring were an indirect cause as well. Our assessments about the future of 
employment security norms presents a mixed picture. We are more hopeful about the norm 
continuing in Japan given its entrenched internal labor market features and the ostensibly strong 
support that all actors, (labor, management, government and society at large) have for preserving 
the norm, provided that the economy emerges out of its recession. We are hopeful about 
employment security in Korea given recent legislative changes that has provided unions with a 
greater voice in decisionmaking, and the strong mobilization efforts of Korean unions who have 
had some bargaining successes of late. We are somewhat less hopeful about employment 
security continuing in India, particularly given the government's commitment to continued 
liberalization and privatization of the state sector, weakening union power nationally, and 
continued efforts to change labor law. We have little hope about the continuance of employment 
security in China, given the legal introduction of short term contracts and the privatization of the 
state owned sector, although the ability of Chinese unions to reverse the erosion in employment 
security is unknown.    
Although the norm of employment security has only directly benefited a minority of workers in 
each of our country cases, the erosion of this norm is concomitant with an increase in inequality 
in all these cases. This may seem counterintuitive given that eroding employment security norms 
lowers the gap between core and periphery workers. However, it also increases the gap between  
workers and non-workers while having broader social ramifications that we were not able to 
explore much in this paper. This issue deserves further attention, especially since increasing 
inequality will likely be a source of major debate in the years ahead. 
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